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Abstract
For physicists, equations are about more than computing physical quantities or construct-
ing formal models; they are also about understanding. The conceptual systems physicists
use to think about nature are made from many different resources, formal and not, working
together and inextricably linked. By blending mathematical forms and physical intuition,
physicists breathe meaning into the equations they use, and this process is fundamental to
what it means for an expert to understand something. In contrast, in physics class, novice
students often treat mathematics as only a calculational tool, isolating it from their rich knowl-
edge of the physical world. We are interested in cases where students break that pattern by
reading, manipulating, and building equations meaningfully rather than purely formally. To
find examples of this and explore the diversity of ways students combine formal and intuitive
resources, we conducted problem-solving interviews with students in an introductory physics
for life sciences class. During the interviews, we scaffolded student use of strategies which call
for both formal and intuitive reasoning, such as “examine the extreme cases” and “think about
the dimensions”. We use the analytic framework of epistemic games to model how students
used the strategies and how they accessed problem-solving resources, and we present evidence
that novice students using these strategies accessed more expert-like conceptual systems than
those typically described in problem-solving literature. They blended physical intuition with
mathematical symbolic templates, reconceptualized the nature of variables and equations, and
distinguished superficially-similar functional forms. Once introduced to a strategy, students
sometimes applied it to new scenarios spontaneously or applied it in new ways to the present
scenario, acknowledging it as a useful, general purpose problem-solving technique. Our data
suggests that these strategies can potentially help novice students learn to develop and apply
their physical intuition more effectively.
1 Introduction
Physicists and educators have long held problem-solving to be one of the key tools to help students
understand physics[MO15]. If problem-solving is a bridge to expert-like understanding, we should
find ways to let students experience expert-like thinking in as many dimensions as possible while
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working problems. This includes learning new physical concepts and mathematical techniques,
because experts and novices differ greatly in the amount of physics and math they know. But
experts also diverge from novices in their problem-solving strategies, their patterns of metacognition
[SS16], their epistemological stances towards their work (and abilities to negotiate between various
stances), their conception of what mathematical entities are, and their expectations for how to
derive meaning from their work. These differences between experts and novices are part of a
“hidden curriculum” that students need to learn as they progress in physics, but which we rarely
teach explicitly.[RSSR10]
In particular, researchers have singled out math as a particular sticking point in problem solving
in introductory physics. Much of the existing research seeks to document student understanding, or
misunderstanding, of particular mathematical tools, such as differentiation or coordinate systems.
Our teaching experience shows that even when students appear to have mastered the appropriate
tools in previous classes, they may still struggle to use those tools effectively in physics problems.
In previous work, one of us (Redish) [RK15] laid out an argument that this is largely because the
ways that physicists make meaning with mathematics are unfamiliar to students. Even if they
are skilled with the manipulations of algebra and calculus, students’ expectations about how to
interpret variables may lead them astray. For example, many students, given a problem about
test charges and electric fields, will say that changing the magnitude of a test charge changes the
magnitude of the electric field it measures. They reason from the equation E = F/q that if q
increases, E decreases. The students understand the math involved well, but don’t account for
the way the force on a charge changes with the charge - there was a hidden functional dependence
they did not see because physics culture assumes the reader will associate every symbol (in this
case, F ) to its physical meaning. That would make the functional dependence of F on q clear,
but students don’t yet expect to have to find this physical meaning when solving problems. The
challenge for educators is to create problems and problem-solving environments that encourage
students to search for physical meaning in mathematics.
In creating problems, educators often separate “qualitative” problems that test and build intu-
ition from “quantitative” problems to develop mathematical skills [HBFH04], indicating an implicit
assumption that these are separate faculties that are used and developed individually. We believe
that for experts, intuition and mathematics are not insulated from each other or even cleanly
separable. Instead, they reinforce each other; intuition is often connected to mathematics and
mathematics is understood partially via intuition. While solving a problem, an expert will blend
mathematical forms such as equations (or abstracted properties of equations), with intuitive con-
ceptual schema to create richer mental spaces than those derived from formal mathematics alone.
For an example of what we mean, we look at Sherin’s [She01] description of “symbolic forms”, a
class of blended intuitive-formal conceptual structures that experts (and in Sherin’s case, second-
year physics students) use to understand equations. To introduce symbolic forms, we’ll take an
example from Sherin, who describes two students thinking about a ball falling through the at-
mosphere at terminal velocity. The students intuitively understand that air drag and gravity are
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both acting on the ball, but balance each other out, leaving no net acceleration. In Sherin’s ac-
count, the students activate a conceptual schema for “balancing” of competing influences. This
balancing schema could potentially match many different physical scenarios, or even everyday sce-
narios, such as expenses balancing out income when breaking even financially, but here is it called
to understand air drag and gravity. The students then associate the balancing schema with the
abstracted symbol template for equations,  = , where each square represents one of the two
balancing influences. The students know that they are looking for an equation with an expression
related to gravity on one side and an expression related to air drag on the other. The students’
work on a specific equation is then informed by this pairing of the intuition behind balancing with
the symbolic template. The combined intuition and formal structure are collectively a symbolic
form. Sherin identified 21 symbolic forms in his data corpus; our purpose here is to use them as
one example of blended intuitive and formal thinking that is found in experts and potentially in
students as well.
Symbolic forms are not a complete account of how physicists make meaning with equations.
The example of failed meaning-making in the equation E = F/q, cited earlier, involves the correct
use of the symbolic form Sherin identified as “prop-”, where a schema related to “if one goes up,
the other goes down” is blended with the symbol template
[
...
...x...
]
, but this symbolic form alone
wasn’t enough to lead students to the right answer.
We cannot give a full account of all the ways experts bring meaning into equations, but as a
second example, we consider experts’ ontology of equations, i.e., the types of objects equations are
in experts’ conceptual schemas. For example, here are a few examples of physicists writing about
the relation between the Yukawa potential, V (r) = qe
−mr
r and the Coulomb potential, V (r) =
q
r .
In the limit of m → 0 the Yukawa potential becomes the Coulomb or gravitational
potential. . . [Hei15]
...if we choose . . .m0 = 0, the potential reduces to the Coulomb potential energy. . . [Tow00]
[source uses m0 in place of m]
We can take the limit α→ 0 and recover the Coulomb potential.[Has13][source uses α
in place of m]
The Coulomb potential of electromagnetism is an example of a Yukawa potential
. . . [Wik16]
We see . . . that if the mass m of the mediating particle vanishes, the force produced
will obey the 1/r2 law. If you trace back over our derivation, you will see that this
comes from the fact that the Lagrangian density for the simplest field theory involves
two powers of the spacetime derivative . . . [Zee10]
In some cases, physicists see themselves as enacting a change in the Yukawa potential. They or
their reader actively “take the limit” or “choosem = 0”. Other times, the Yukawa potential changes,
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but there’s no clear agent involved. It may “become” or “reduce to” the Coulomb potential and the
mass may “vanish”, but no entity is identified as enacting the change. In contrast to these dynamic
descriptions, the relationship can also be described statically. Nothing in particular is happening
when the Coulomb potential "is an example of" the Yukawa potential.
This is just a sampling of physicists’ language on the topic. The details of how they describe
the Yukawa potential-Coulomb potential relationship may depend on both the physicist and the
context of what they’re communicating in complicated ways. Our goal here is simply to illustrate
that there is a significant diversity of ways to conceptualize of an equation.
These examples come from professional, graduate, and upper-division undergraduate mate-
rial, where such a diversity of conceptualizations of equations is commonplace. By contrast, in
introductory physics textbooks, equations are usually treated as static entities to be scrutinized.
Outside the nucleus the nuclear force is negligible, and the potential is given by Coulomb’s
law, U(r) = +k(2e)(Ze)/r,. . . [TM07]
Coulomb’s law can be written in vector form (as we did for newton’s law of universal
gravitation in Chapter 6, Section 6-2), as F˜12 = kQ1Q2r221 rˆ21 . . . [Gia00]
The electric force acting on a point charge q1 as a result of the presence of a second
point charge q2 is given by Coulomb’s Law: F = kq1q2r2 =
q1
q2
4pi0r
2[Nav17]
The main exception we have observed is for descriptions of formal operations on them that come
up during derivations (e.g. “differentiate with respect to t”, “set them equal to each other”, etc.),
although the equations are also sometimes described as active entities, for example "Coulomb’s
law describes a force of infinite range which obeys the inverse square law [Nav17]" in that they
"describe" things, but this does not represent the same diversity of conceptions we saw with regard
to the Coulomb and Yukawa potentials.
This mostly-static view of equations stands in contrast to introductory physics sources’ descrip-
tions of the physical quantities the equations represent
We can divide up a charge distribution into infinitesimal charges . . . [Gia00]
The force exerted by one point charge on another acts along the line joining the charges.
It varies inversely as the square of the distance separating the charges and is propor-
tional to the product of the charges. [TM07]
In describing the force, field, or charges associated with Coulomb’s law, introductory use both
agentive language ("We can divide") and non-agentive ("The force . . . acts. . . "). The second quota-
tion here also mixes dynamic ("varies inversely. . . ") with static ("is proportional to. . . ") language
in the same sentence. So while a diversity of ontological viewpoints are generally considered accept-
able for thinking about physics in introductory settings, this seems to apply much more to physical
quantities than to equations, but as we move to more expert settings, the equations themselves
take on the same diversity of ontologies.
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Sfard’s [Sfa91] notion of conceiving of functions as either objects or processes is similar to ours,
but here we consider “process” views where the equation itself is changing, as opposed to Sfard’s
notion of a static function which describes change when inputs transform into outputs. Our point
here is simply to illustrate one more small piece of the diversity in expert conceptual systems used
to make mathematics physically meaningful. This piece, like symbolic forms, is never explicitly
taught. It is a part of the hidden curriculum, and something we can try to find evolving in students
as they progress towards expertise.
Based on an exploratory analysis of problem-solving interviews, we suggest that students, in the
right circumstances, use a large and diverse arsenal of productive, sophisticated, and creative ways
to conceptualize physics problem-solving. They do not always access these resources when they
would be productive, and many of the difficulties students experience with using math in physics are
not so much difficulties of having the appropriate tools, but of applying them appropriately. While
much of the hidden curriculum will need to be learned via years of enculturation in the physics
community, there are entire swaths of it that don’t need to be explicitly taught so much as activated.
Small interventions that encourage students to use specific problem-solving strategies, can, in some
cases, greatly enhance students’ access to productive ways of thinking about mathematical tools
that are rarely explicitly taught.
The strategies we’re investigating are commonplace, well-known to physicists, and generally
well-regarded components of effective problem-solving. They include examining special and ex-
treme cases, dimensional analysis, and estimation. Our contribution to understanding these strate-
gies is to suggest that their scope can be very broad; they can be used at different stages of
problem-solving and in different ways - and to give examples of how students using these strategies
construct meaning from mathematical expressions in ways similar to how experts do it.
2 Theoretical Framework:
Resources, Framing, and Epistemic Games
Our analysis is situated in the resource model [Ham00, Red04]. In this framework, students don’t
have monolithic conceptual understandings; they have many small pieces of knowledge, or resources
that they can call on while solving a problem. When solving a problem, students will activate vari-
ous resources and construct a solution based on them. If students don’t solve a problem correctly, it
may be that they don’t have the appropriate resources, or that they do, but aren’t activating them
in that context. In the previous example of a test charge and the measured electric field, students
did activate resources relating to understanding inverse mathematical relationships (including the
prop- symbolic form), but did not activate resources related to the functional dependence of force.
Whether or not students activate a resource can depend on how they associate it with other re-
sources they are using, so in a future problem, students might improve their performance if they’ve
learned to activate resources related to functional dependence when they see questions about forces
in electromagnetism.
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The issue is not so simple, though. The students in question were all able to recite the mantra
“the electric field is independent of the test charge”. In this sense, they knew the answer to the
problem, but they didn’t call on this knowledge, or if they did, didn’t apply it. In addition
to resources related to manipulating mathematical equations and resources related to intuitive
understanding of physics, students also have “epistemological resources”, resources related to how
they seek to obtain and justify knowledge [HE03].
A student who uses an equation because it makes intuitive sense may come to the same answer
as a student who uses an equation they found in a textbook they consider authoritative, but the
way they are thinking about knowledge is very different; they are using different epistemological
resources. The students who answer the test charge problem incorrectly are probably not activating
epistemological resources related to interpreting each variable physically, or resources related to
finding concordance between memorized facts (such as the electric field being independent of the
charge) and the results of reasoning based on equations.
To understand why students sometimes use one set of epistemological resources and sometimes
another, we use the lens of epistemological framing [BR09]. Because we could potentially use any
resource at our disposal (i.e. every fact, technique, or type of reasoning we can conceive of) on
a given problem, the space of problem-solving strategies we have to search through to find one
effective approach is extremely large. We begin by narrowing the problem down to a certain type
of problem, and then search through the resources we associate with that type. Calling on a
physical principle to solve a problem requires activating different epistemological resources than
using an equation does, and those resources often are associated with different epistemological
framing. [GE11, KHGE13] Students who answered that changing the magnitude of a test charge
changes the magnitude of the measured electric field may have entered a “calculation” frame, and
didn’t remember or pay attention to their knowledge that the electric field is independent of the
test charge because they didn’t frame the task as one in which physical principles are relevant.
Moving towards expertise in problem solving is as much about using what resources you have
effectively as it is about picking up new resources. As students work physics problems, they need
to learn not only new content, but new ways of relating to the content. They need to be able
to effectively frame epistemologically and activate appropriate resources. All of these are difficult
tasks that live mostly in the hidden curriculum.
Analyses of problem solving often break the task down into a series of steps. Sometimes this is
prescriptive, as when textbooks list a series of steps to make in solving a problem. For example,
Redish [RSSR10] describes a textbook with the following scaffold for problem solving
Model! - Make simplifying assumptions.
Visualize! - Draw a pictorial representation.
Solve! - Do the math.
Assess! - Check your result has the correct units, is reasonable, and answers the question
and gives an example where the method failed. The textbook posed a question asking us to
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find the volume occupied by the water evaporated after sweating during exercise. The solution
manual followed each step, finding that the volume was simply the volume of an ideal gas with
the appropriate number of molecules, ignoring that the evaporated water will, by convection and
diffusion, spread out over a very large volume. The textbook’s solution manual follows each
individual step, but nonetheless comes to a nonsensical answer to a problem by failing to “tell the
story of the problem”. From this example, Redish finds
Tying the analysis to a rubric – a formal set of mapped rules . . . does not help if it does
not also activate an intuitive sense of meaning by tying the problem to all we know and
recognize about a system
We also view problem-solving as a series of steps, but not as steps for students to follow, but as
a framework for researchers to understand how students solve problems. This approach is common
in physics education research. For example, in analyzing student difficulties using math in physics,
Wilcox et. al [WCRP13] proposed the ACER framework, which consists of Activation of the tool,
Construction of the model, Execution of the mathematics, and Reflection on the result.
Whereas a prescriptive problem-solving script tells students to follow precise steps in a given
order, Wilcox et. al. write, “. . . we are not suggesting that all physics problems are solved in some
clearly organized fashion, but a well articulated, complete solution involves all components of the
ACER framework.” That is, having the framework allows the researchers to narrow their focus and
identify specific tasks students are struggling with, rather than simply bemoaning that they can’t
apply math appropriately. In that paper, Wilcox et. al. found that students’ resources for the
technique of taking a Taylor expansion weren’t activated by the appropriate signal, which was one
variable of interest being very much smaller than another, and suggested that problems be written
to focus on building this particular association for students between signal and mathematical
technique.
Frameworks like ACER are effective at picking out specific technical steps that students don’t
take in problem-solving. Our interest here is broader, including student epistemologies, attitudes
towards mathematics, conceptualization of the entities involved, and other aspects of the hidden
curriculum. The framework of epistemic games is a flexible one that allows analysis of both
problem-solving moves and the motivations behind them.
We have previously discussed epistemological frames in problem-solving. Framing is a general
feature in psychology, and when we work in a particular frame it often cues a script for how that
type of activity typically goes, which sets expectations for what will happen next and what sorts
of actions are appropriate [Gof74].
An epistemic game is a script that allows us to understand the moves students make in problem
solving [TR07]. As we watch students solving problems, we assign their problem-solving to some
particular epistemic game, which we take to structure the types of resources they call on and the
order in which they use them. An epistemic game will generally have a particular epistemological
frame associated with it, but adds additional structure. The viability of epistemic games as an
analysis framework stems from its psychological plausibility via the connection to psychological
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scripts and that, when Tuminaro and Redish [TR07] analyzed student problem solving, they found
that certain epistemic games were repeated many times on different problems and in different
circumstances. The term “epistemic game” comes from Collins and Ferguson [CF93], although the
version we use here is that of Tuminaro and Redish [TR07].
In an epistemic game, as in games like solitaire or chess, one or several players make moves.
These moves might be mathematical moves, such as add the same quantity to both sides of the
equation, conversational moves, such as offer a reason supporting your position, or physical moves,
such as draw a picture of the situation. Because players can make various types of moves, analyzing
the moves lets us focus on different aspects of the hidden curriculum in problem-solving.
As the players of an epistemic game make moves, they gradually fill out an epistemological
form, a template for what the solution to the problem should look like, which may be physical or
verbal. Finally, players either reach the e-game’s stopping condition and decide they are done, or
else switch to a different game or give up on the solution attempt.
Tuminaro and Redish identified six common games that students play during problem solving,
such as recursive plug-and-chug, in which students identify a formula and put values into it without
interpreting the results, and mapping meaning to mathematics, which describes the problem solving
process in which students analyze the physics of a situation, turn their analysis into equations,
manipulate the equations, and then turn the result into a new physical understanding.
Students use e-games to guide their inquiry, and their (generally unconscious) choices for what
e-game to play have large effects on their problem-solving process. Different games have different
rules about what sort of evidence is salient, what sort of moves are allowed, what type of arguments
to give, and what it means to be done with a problem. When students get stuck on a problem or
come to answers that don’t make sense from the viewpoint of experts, they often have resources
that would allow them to solve the problem, but never access them because they are not included
in the current frame [TR07, BR12].
We do not consider playing an epistemic game favorable or unfavorable; that depends on which
epistemic game and how appropriate it is to the situation. Epistemic games also aren’t confined
to students; experts play them as well, and do it very effectively. For example, in his short paper
“A Model of Leptons” [Wei67], Weinberg searches for an equation to describe leptons and their
interactions. The method is to list various properties the equation should have—what symmetries
it has, what types of solutions to avoid, etc. Each such consideration can be translated into a
particular feature that the final equation should have, and by combining a sufficient number of
features, only one equation is left that satisfies them all—the final equation derived for leptons and
their interactions. Weinberg is playing an epistemic game we call “significant features”. This is a
game used to generate solutions to a given problem (as opposed to evaluating a proposed solution).
To play, one lists relevant significant features a solution ought to have, such as a maximum at a
certain place, or matching a certain symbolic form. Each feature is translated into a formal
constraint or piece of the sought solution, such as the derivative being zero at the maximum or
a symbolic template which matches the symbolic form appearing in the equation. As the player
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discovers more features and their associated forms, they gradually fill out the equation (or plot
or other form) they are seeking. The game ends when they either decide they have completely
specified the answer to the problem or decide that they don’t know enough features to do so.
In Sherin’s work [She01], two students decide that under constant acceleration the equation
for velocity as a function of time is either v(t) = v0 + at or v(t) = v0 + 12at
2, but cannot decide
between the two. Sherin analyzes this as using the “base plus change” symbolic form. Students
conceptualize the situation as velocity starting at some given value, then changing to a new value,
and realize that this maps onto the symbolic template +∆. The symbolic form doesn’t distinguish
between the terms at and 12at
2 as “changes” to map onto ∆ in the symbolic template. Both are
positive (for positive acceleration and time) and indicate an object speeding up. Sherin’s analysis
is that using only a symbolic form isn’t enough for students to determine the correct equation. We
agree, and add that the students are playing the same “significant features” game that Weinberg
did in building a model of leptons. They begin with a feature they want to the solution to have -
matching the conceptual schema of base + change, and translate that into a mathematical form -
the + ∆ symbol template. Although they ran out of features to finish constraining their answer
to the one correct answer, they were nonetheless playing the same epistemic game, just with very
different material and at different levels of expertise.
3 Data and Analysis
The students we interviewed were enrolled in an introductory physics for life science course at
the University of Maryland. Most are juniors, with some sophomores and seniors. The course
prerequisites include one semester each of calculus, probability, chemistry, and two semesters of
biology. Students are mixed between having taken physics in high school and not.
This is a population of relative novices in physics, but who have taken from 5 - 12 college
science courses before taking this one; they generally have strong expectations about how science
courses and problem-solving in them work, which the instructor (Redish) routinely challenges.(See
[RBC+14] for more details on the creation and principles behind the course.) We conducted hour-
long interviews with students enrolled in the first of two semesters of this course. All interviews
used a think-aloud protocol, encouraging students to write and articulate their thoughts at all times
as they solved problems. Some interviews were one-on-one with the interviewer (Eichenlaub) and
other were group interviews in which the interviewer was present but participated minimally, with
occasional small interventions designed to prompt use of specific problem-solving strategies.
With these interviews, we were interested in the breadth of approaches and conceptualizations
students take in problem solving, including whether and how they blend physical intuition with
mathematical formalism and how they conceive of variables, parameters, and entire equations. We
chose problems and problem-solving strategies that we hoped would elicit epistemic games with
a strong interplay of intuition and formalism in hopes of bringing out a diversity of interesting
conceptual systems in students’ solution attempts. The strategies we investigated were examine
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extreme or special cases, dimensional analysis, and estimation, chosen especially because they
are all familiar parts of an expert physicists’ toolkit, but are not always taught explicitly at the
introductory level.
We wanted to make fine-grained analysis of small, interesting incidents in our interviews, so
we took video of the interviews ensuring that the field of view captured all students (for group
interview) or student and interviewer (for one-on-one interviews) so that we could reference speech,
gesture, and other expressions. Students wrote on a whiteboard, which we photographed at the
interview’s conclusion.
Our goal in analyzing these interviews was to generate hypotheses about cognitively-rich ways
that students can interact with math and physics. This was exploratory analysis, not confirmatory,
so the results we present here are case studies to be examined in more detail in the future. Our focus
was on finding particularly interesting moments throughout the problem-solving sessions, including
moments of blended mathematical/intuitive sensemaking and moments that show how students
conceive of the mathematical entities they’re working with. To that end, we reviewed the videos
highlighting incidents that stood out to us, then discussed them together to generate hypotheses
regarding student conceptualizations that interested us. Here we present those hypotheses along
with descriptions of the incidents that we watched while generating them.
Below, we describe each strategy and report briefly on how students in our interviews took up
the strategy before discussing, through the lens of epistemic games, specific cognitive aspects of
problem-solving that these strategies elicited.
3.1 Extreme and Special Cases
Most physical systems we examine in problem solving have one or more free parameters that enters
the problem. For example, in trying find the effective spring constant of two springs connected
in series to form a single combined spring, the individual spring constants are such parameters.
If we set one of these parameters to its largest or smallest possible value, we’re looking at an
extreme case. So for springs in series, we could set the second spring constant to be infinite, in
which case it is completely rigid, does not contribute at all to the stretching of the combined
spring, and the effective spring constant would simply be that of the other spring. Using this fact
to try to understand something about the general situation is a strategy we call “extreme case”
reasoning. We might also consider the case where the two spring constants are equal. Then each
spring stretches the same amount, the total stretch is twice as much as the stretch of an individual
spring, and the effective spring constant is half that of an individual spring. We call this “special
case” reasoning. The two are almost the same, but extreme cases have been discussed independently
in the literature, so we identify them as separate but closely-related reasoning strategies.
Clement [CS09] studied extreme cases in a grade school setting, finding that looking at the
extreme case helps students build vivid, dynamic mental imagery, consistently leading to better
intuitive understanding of physics scenarios. Used in quantitative problem solving, extreme cases
not only boost our intuition, but also allow us to connect that intuition to equations we’ve generated
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or are considering. Our accuracy and intuition for thinking about extreme cases has led physicists
to make their study a standard problem-solving tool [Mor08]. Nearing [N+03] elaborated on why
extreme cases lead to better intuition in his undergraduate textbook on mathematical physics
How do you learn intuition?
When you’ve finished a problem and your answer agrees with the back of the book
or with your friends or even a teacher, you’re not done. The way to get an intuitive
understanding of the mathematics and of the physics is to analyze your solution thor-
oughly. Does it make sense? There are almost always several parameters that enter
the problem, so what happens to your solution when you push these parameters to
their limits? In a mechanics problem, what if one mass is much larger than another?
Does your solution do the right thing? In electromagnetism, if you make a couple of
parameters equal to each other does it reduce everything to a simple, special case?
When you’re doing a surface integral should the answer be positive or negative and
does your answer agree?
When you address these questions to every problem you ever solve, you do several
things. First, you’ll find your own mistakes before someone else does. Second, you
acquire an intuition about how the equations ought to behave and how the world that
they describe ought to behave. Third, It makes all your later efforts easier because you
will then have some clue about why the equations work the way they do. It reifies the
algebra.
Extreme cases, to Nearing, are not about the physics situation alone or the mathematical
expression alone, but a way of bridging the two into a unified qualitative and quantitative under-
standing of physics.
In a prototypical use of the extreme or special case reasoning, students first derive an expression,
in terms of parameters of the problem, that is a potential solution to the problem, for example
finding the acceleration of a block in terms of various masses, angles, and coefficients of friction
involved. They then use their physical intuition for extreme cases to evaluate this potential solution.
This evaluative use can be analyzed as a “sanity check” epistemic game. This game begins
after students generate a candidate solution to a problem, and is used to test whether the solution
makes sense. The prototypical moves of the game are
1. Identify a feature which the candidate solution intuitively ought to have.
2. Check whether the candidate solution has this feature.
3. If it does, identify a new feature the solution ought to have. If it does not, either reject the
solution and start over, or enter a new epistemic game to determine why the solution and
feature do not match.
4. Continue playing the game until you can’t think of any more features or are satisfied with
your confidence in the candidate solution.
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When playing the sanity check game with the extreme case strategy, these moves could look
like this:
1. Identify a physical variable in the problem.
2. Imagine it becoming extremely large, extremely small, or some special value that stands out.
3. Intuitively identify the behavior of the system in this case.
4. Analyze the same limit of expression in the potential solution.
5. Compare the results of (3) and (4) for consistency. If they are consistent, confidence in the
solution increases. If they are inconsistent, choose a new e-game to figure out whether it is
your intuition or the mathematical expression that is incorrect.
6. Repeat for other variables in the problem.
This game encourages students to repeatedly compare a mathematical expression with a phys-
ical intuition, and so promises to be a good place to learn about how students use math to inform
physical understanding and vice versa.
Although we’ve outlined a canonical version of the game above, physicists use extreme cases
in many other ways. The snippets from physicists discussing the relation between the Yukawa
and Coulomb potentials in section 1 discuss sending a parameter (α) to an extreme (zero), but
instead of examining the physical behavior of a system in this limit, they discuss an equation itself
simplifying to a different equation.
Further, in many cases beyond the introductory classroom, we can only find analytic solu-
tions for the limiting cases of an equation, so studying the asymptotic behavior of otherwise
intractable physical systems has become the most common analytical approach in modern mathe-
matical physics [BO99]. As a result, extreme cases and special cases lead to a host of useful tools,
resources, and intuitions for physicists, including for example perturbation theory and the WKB
method. The power of this game is one of the reasons that the predilection of introductory students
to “put numbers in right away” (thereby reducing the problem to one that looks more like “just
math”) is so counter-productive.
In interviews, we gave students several problems where we expected the extreme cases game to
be useful: the half-Atwood machine (Figure 1), the electric field on the axis of a ring of charge,
springs in series and parallel, and the area of an ellipse.
In every case, we found that students have strong and accurate physical intuitions for the
extreme or special cases. In some circumstances, students consistently spontaneously play the
sanity check game using special case reasoning. For example, every student interviewed on the
ellipse problem (Figure 2) considered the special case a = b, a circle, and used it to evaluate the
given answers. No students, on the other hand, spontaneously checked the extreme case a → 0,
however, when prompted by the interviewer to consider “a long, skinny ellipse”, most did use this
extreme case to answer the question correctly.
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Figure 1: The half-Atwood problem: A block of mass M is attached to a block of mass m via a
massless string strung over a pulley as shown. The setup is frictionless. What is the acceleration
of the block m?
Figure 2: The ellipse problem
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Extreme/special case reasoning also proved consistently valuable to students answering the
half-Atwood problem (Figure 1) and to students finding the electric field on the axis of a ring of
charge.
The students in our interviews found this strategy less effective when asked to determine the
effective spring constant of two springs connected in series. Asked to consider this problem without
being prompted to think of extreme cases, Lizzie, Myra, and Lelia (pseudonyms) had the following
discussion:
1. Lelia: What’s Hooke’s law again? Oh yeah, T is this. [writes an equation for
Hooke’s law] So in this. The length would technically be twice as long.
2. Lizzie: oh for the two
3. Lelia: technically this k coefficient would be twice as long as one of them.
4. Lizzie: yeah [erases board and writes T = k∆L]
5. Lelia: so I think k-series would be them added together. Cause I remember I
remember from
6. Lizzie: the homework
7. Lelia: yeah there’s two connected the new k coefficient is twice as much, I think.
8. Lizzie: we have two k’s. [all writing equations involving k, T , and ∆L]
9. Lizzie: k-series would be k-one plus k-two
10. Lelia: yeah, that’s what I’m thinking
Lizzie, Lelia, and Myra (did not speak above) associate higher spring constants with more
length of the spring, leading them to conclude that springs in series have an a spring constant that
adds. After working on other problems for twenty minutes, they returned to the springs, and the
interviewer asked what would happen if one spring were much stiffer than the other
1. Lizzie: the stretch, the easy one would stretch a lot
2. Lelia: and the hard one would stretch a little bit, so the total stretch would be
mostly due to the softer spring. so i mean again I guess k-constant would be the
softer one.
3. Lizzie: but the hard one would still contribute a little bit
4. Lelia: yeah, but we don’t know. I don’t know how much, you know what percent-
age
5. Myra: can we like divide it by the number of springs?
6. Lelia: like k-one plus k-two divided by two or something?
7. Lizzie: or n?
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8. Myra: cause I’m thinking because if one is way easier to stretch and the other
one is not stretching at all, but each spring is still contributing some stretching,
so then you divide it by the number of springs.
Their physical intuition is correct, but in the remaining time, they are unable to match their
intuition to an equation, and ultimately revert to their original answer of keff = k1 + k2. Al-
though their effort to play extreme cases didn’t result in a correct equation, they did make correct
conclusions about the mathematical form of the answer, specifically that the effective constant
should be (very nearly) the same as that of the softer spring, and they consistently attempted to
match physical intuition to equations. However, without a clear mapping from spring constants
onto physical stiffness, it was difficult for them to find a correct equation.
3.2 The Dimensional Analysis Game
There are several strategies based on the idea that if two physical quantities are equal, they must
have the same dimensions. We refer to these strategies collectively as “dimensional analysis”, and
they are taught extensively at the introductory level [Rob15], while also remaining of professional
interest to physicists for more than a century [Bri22]. A prototypical example of playing the sanity
check epistemic game for evaluating a formula using dimensional analysis would be
1. Find an equation that may be a solution to a given problem.
2. Evaluate the physical dimensions of each term on the left side of the equation.
3. Multiply the dimensions of all terms on the left hand side together to get the dimensions of
the entire left hand side.
4. Repeat (2) and (3) for the right hand side.
5. Compare the dimensions of each side of the equation. If they are the same, the equation may
be correct. If they are not, the equation is incorrect.
This game allows students to catch some mistakes in their answers. Students in our sample
played dimensional analysis readily on questions that specifically asked about dimensions, for
example asking which of a set of four formulas could be the surface area of an object, but also
occasionally used it productively in questions aimed understanding functional relationships. For
example, when asked,
Sixteen students are sharing N large cheese pizzas. Assuming that the students share
the pizza evenly, which expression gives the number of students each pizza must feed?
many students had difficulty choosing between the expressions N/16 and 16/N , among other
distractors. Two interviewees noted that the number 16 had units of students, and because the
answer they were looking for had units of students, the choice must be 16/N
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Our data set was not set up to investigate the more elaborate dimensional analysis game in
which students are asked to use the dimensions of relevant variables to explicitly construct formulas,
or pieces of formulas, in cases where the full analytical derivation is too long, complicated, or
intractable to be useful [Rob15], although we believe this game would be interesting to research in
the future. Constructing a formula from elemental pieces, as well as understanding an incomplete
formula which contains scaling information but cannot be numerically evaluated, may lead to rich
student cognition.
3.3 Estimation
By estimation, we mean integrating personal knowledge, a corpus of memorized numbers, and
approximation heuristics to obtain order-of-magnitude estimates of interesting quantities, either in
physics or in everyday scenarios. Like dimensional analysis and examining extreme cases, estima-
tion is a highly valued in the physics community and in physics education, which have a culture
of “Fermi estimates”, “back of the envelope” calculations, and “order of magnitude” estimates. For
example, The Physics Teacher publishes a “Fermi Question” in each issue, and several universities
have undergraduate courses in estimation [Phi, Chi].
We chose to investigate estimation because performing estimates generally requires students
to think about their everyday experience and find methods of quantifying it, often while building
equations that multiply various such terms together. Thus, it forces students to use intuition and
a formal understanding of mathematics simultaneously.
A case study by Modir et. al. [MIWS14] established an estimation epistemic game involving
six moves,
1. Problematize
2. Propose method
3. What to remember
4. See if parts are enough
5. Pure Calculations
6. Evaluation
and documented how a student estimated the energy in a hurricane by going rapidly forward and
backward between these moves.
In one of our interviews, a group of four students, Amelia, Zane, Jean, and Chris, attempt to
estimate the time it would take a submersible submarine to sink to the bottom of the ocean. The
group agreed to assume the ocean was 1000m deep, and Jean calculated a descent time of about
fourteen seconds by assuming the sphere fell with ordinary gravitational acceleration. Several
group members challenged the notion that the submersible would accelerate during its descent
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and proposed it would instead fall at terminal velocity, but never reached consensus before the
following exchange
1. Amelia: Well if you think about it based on the previous situation that we said,
we said it was at a thousand meters (Jean: mmhmm) the force was two thousand
newtons. Fourteen seconds technically could be legible just because a thousand
meters isn’t really a lot. We have a really heavy (Zane: that’s true) like sub-
mersible, so it kind of makes sense in that situation.
2. Zane: let’s go with it
3. Jean: go with the...
4. Zane: fourteen seconds, yeah
5. Amelia: It all depends on like, all these variables. With these variables it would
make sense that it would be dropping that fast.
6. Jean: And we’re assuming there’s no um, buoyant force, no viscous force
Although Zane called on counterintuitions several minutes before this exchange (“it’s not going
to hit, you know, a hundred thousand miles per hour at the bottom.”), and repeatedly argued
against the constant acceleration approach, the group decided that their calculation “kind of makes
sense”, ultimately accepting a highly unreasonable answer. Despite their incorrect conclusion, we
see in this passage group members calling on a sense of whether numbers are reasonable for a
given physical situation, questioning the relation between unknown parameters and quantities of
interest, and examining the simplifying physical assumptions that go into their reasoning. At the
conclusion of the interview, the interviewer mentioned that their conclusion had the submersible
reaching the ocean floor at roughly 300 miles per hour, and the group burst out laughing. It may
be that the group’s considerable efforts at sense-making failed largely due to an unfamiliarity with
the relevant units, as well as neglecting to convert them into more everyday terms.
In this incident, we see a group negotiating what physical effects to model mathematically
and what to ignore. This skill is essential to all physical modeling. For example, in introductory
physics we often model the flight of a thrown ball using only a uniform gravitational force, giving
a parabolic trajectory. In doing so, we ignore aerodynamic drag, other aerodynamic effects (e.g.
lift), nonuniformity of the gravitational field, inertial forces due to Earth’s rotation, magnetization
of the ball in Earth’s magnetic field, the Yarkovsky effect, momentum imparted by sunlight the
ball absorbs, transfer of material in and out of the ball’s surface, and many other effects. Some of
these can be important or not for a ball, depending on the accuracy we want and the parameters of
the situation. Others are effectively never important for a ball thrown on Earth, but are relevant
for, e.g. dust particles in space. Physicists often estimate the sizes of such effects to see whether
they belong in more complete and explicit model. By improving student estimation skills, we also
empower them to build better-informed mathematical models, and to understand the extent of
those models’ applicability.
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4 The Nature of Equations
In physics education, there has been considerable effort to understand the ways the different ways
that students view equations epistemologically [AL09], e.g. whether they ought to map closely to
phenomena or be treated formally, be accepted as given by authority or derived from fundamental
principle, and their relationship to modeling. Here, we are interested in a different type of view of
equations: their ontology, or what types of object they’re considered to be.
Earlier, using the example of physicists discussing the Yukawa and Coulomb potentials, we
suggested that there is a variety of ways that physicists conceive of the equations they’re working
with. Physicists in different contexts speaking to different audiences sometimes thought of equa-
tions as dynamic objects, with one equation transforming into another, and other times thought
of them as static, with one equation being a special case of another. Additionally, when equations
changed, sometimes it was the speaker or the audience actively making the change, and sometimes
the equation changed without a specific agent being identified.
The three problem-solving strategies introduced so far all call on students to think about
equations in new ways—to hold them accountable to common sense (estimation) and to check
various features of them (dimensions and special cases). We might wonder whether interacting
with equations in certain ways changes the conceptualization that students have of equations.
In watching students play epistemic games with mathematics, we saw a diversity of concep-
tualizations of equations emerge. For example, Alma, in working the ellipse problem, checks the
special case a = b with reference to the formula A = pi
(
a+b
2
)2
. . . so a plus b squared over two squared times two is four plus b that would be 2 ab.
b squared plus yeah. okay. yeah. okay. so then you would have r squared plus two r
squared plus r squared which equals pi four r squared over four, so I guess it’s a plus
b over two cause you’re taking the average. Oh, it’s like you’re turning into a circle.
that’s cool. yeah.
By checking the special case, the ellipse is “turning into a circle”, but Alma makes this reference
not while working with the geometric object, but with the equation and substitutions on it that
she was making. In other words, the ellipse is “turning into a circle” in that it becomes the formula
for the area of a circle when a = b = r. This dynamic picture of an equation mirrors that a
Yukawa potential that “becomes the Coulomb” potential in an extreme case. She is working with
the formula, but instead of saying that the formula turns into a formula for a circle, she says
“you’re turning it into a circle”, referencing a geometric object (the circle) while working with
a non-geometric object (the formula). We suggest that for Alma, in this moment, there is no
significant distinction between the formula and the object it describes, which, if correct, shows a
very strong example of binding meaning to an equation.
Similarly, Amelia was examining the equation N(t) = N0e−t/τ for the number N of particles
remaining when they decay over time t with a time constant τ . In examining the special case where
half of the original number of particles remain, Amelia described actively changing equations via
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procedural language, such as “I divide each side by the initial amount. I el-en [take the natural
logarithm of] each side”, but she also described changing equations not according to any fixed
procedural rules, “I changed the equation, if I’m doing this logic, because I don’t remember what
the half life equation is off the top of my head. So I rewrote the equation to say that Q(t) is equal
to one half times the initial amount times e to the negative t. t referring to just time. . . ”
In both cases, the agency in changing the equation lies in Amelia herself. In the first case, she
follows formal manipulations. In the second, she is “doing this by logic”, presumably a reference
to some mix of common sense, intuition, and reasoning, as a contrast to memorization, and she
created an entirely new equation based off a template from the old one, assigning specific physical
meaning to each term she created.
Students can take varied stances towards the types of objects that equations are while manipu-
lating, creating, and interpreting them in many contexts, not simply in the context of the strategies
we investigated. We believe this menagerie of conceptualizations of equations and interactions with
them is especially rich in these epistemic games that play out with these strategies due to their
requirements to blend symbology and physical meaning.
5 Blending and Sensemaking
In most frameworks to analyze student use of mathematics, there is a step in which the student
manipulates the equations. For example, in ACER, this step is Execution of the mathematics,
described as
Transforming the math structures (e.g., unevaluated integrals) in the construction com-
ponent into relevant mathematical expressions (e.g., evaluated integrals) is often nec-
essary to uncover solutions. Each mathematical tool requires a specific set of steps and
basic knowledge. For example, executing a Taylor approximation may require knowl-
edge of common expansion templates (e.g., sinx ≈ x + x3/3! + . . .) and how to adapt
these templates to the mathematical model developed previously. Alternatively, one
might need to know how to compute derivatives of complex functions. The mathe-
matical procedures performed in this component are not, at least to experts, context
free. In addition to employing base mathematical skills, experts maintain awareness of
the meaning of each symbol in the expression (e.g., which symbols are constants when
taking derivatives).
Although this description indicates that the operations are not purely formal, and that the
problem-solver needs to remember the context and meaning of the symbols, the steps on which
we understand the equations’ emergent meaning and match them to physical understanding are
separate steps from the steps of symbolic manipulation under these frameworks.
Research on the manipulation step has mostly focused on the difficulties that students have in
making manipulations or on the procedural resources they use while manipulating equations (for
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example, thinking of physically sliding a variable from the numerator of one side of an equation to
the denominator of another)[WB15].
Experts use individual mathematical manipulations as sources of physical sensemaking. Kus-
tusch et al. [KRDM14] studied physics professors solving a thermodynamics problem that involved
taking partial derivatives. There were many choices for which derivatives to take, and experts used
physical insight into the derivatives’ meaning to guide their choices. In a review of the literature on
mathematical sensemaking inside the mathematical manipulation steps of problem-solving, Kuo
et. al. found “no studies that focused upon the mathematical processing step in quantitative
problem solving or described alternatives to using equations as computational tools.” [KHGE13]
The same authors then contrasted two students, one who describes a kinematic formula in terms
of its meaning via a symbolic form, another who saw the formula essentially as a black-box tool,
and found that these students performed the mathematical manipulations in a problem using that
kinematic concept differently. The student who understood the formula via a symbolic form was
able to blend mathematical and physical reasoning to take a shortcut solution to the problem,
while the other student was not.
If we value this sort of blended sensemaking, it is valuable to find ways to encourage it in
students, and we believe extreme-case reasoning is one way to do this. In order to use extreme
case reasoning, students must think about formulas and physical systems simultaneously, and as a
result, they find new and creative ways of conceptualizing and manipulating equations.
For example, Myra, while considering the “springs in series” problem, has written Tk1 +
T
k2
=
∆Ltotal =
Tsum
kseries
and below it Tk1 +
T
k2
= Tkseries on her whiteboard, saying
I’m thinking that if you apply a constant force, for k-one will give like this amount of
length plus k-two will give like this amount of length, then that’s like the total amount
of length of the series, which equals to k over T-series. And that makes sense to me. I
just don’t know how you would like not put the T in the equation.
Although the group did not take up her method and she soon abandoned it, Myra’s expression
was correct, and a short algebra step away from the desired solution. In generating this expression,
Myra didn’t start with basic definitions and follow a purely formal procedure. Instead, she blended
her conceptual understanding of stretching with the mathematical formalism while manipulating
mathematical expressions.
Shortly before, Lelia stated, "and both would contribute just like one would contribute like one
would have less change than the other. they’d still both probably be a part of the stretch." Myra’s
key insight was to translate this “both contributing” intuition into a symbolic form [She01], a basic
template for and equation, along with a meaning used to understand entire classes of equations
that build on that template. Here, Myra uses what Sherin identifies as the “parts of a whole”
template, [++ . . .].
Myra fits Lelia’s idea about both springs contributing stretch onto this template via the heuristic
equation stretch1 + stretch2 = stretchtotal. Then, using the definition of a spring constant, which
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contains a variable ∆L for the stretch of the spring, Myra substitutes in the stretch of each spring,
making each term physically meaningful as she does, obtaining Tk1 +
T
k2
= Tkseries .
In a separate instance, Bert was working on the half-Atwood problem. His solution had a sign
error, a = mgm−M instead of the correct a =
mg
m+M , due to an inconsistency in how he set up his
coordinate system.
The interviewer introduced and scaffolded the extreme and special case game for Bert, who
readily took it up, discovering that his solution had the blocks reversing direction based on their
mass, which he rejected as intuitively incorrect. Instead of reworking the entire problem from
scratch, Bert tried making small modifications to his answer to eliminate the problem, for example
introducing an absolute value in the denominator to keep it from changing signs. As he continued
introducing and testing new solutions, he looked at M−mmg as a potential solution, considered the
extreme case where M  m, and said
So then this is super big that’s super small. [pauses, draws a minus sign on M in the
numerator] Still doesn’t make sense. Still not working. Cause one of these [the masses]
are big then it’s gonna be big acceleration. That’s not what should happen. Should be
as this one grows [points toM ] it gets smaller, so like that has to be in the denominator.
In suggesting thatM must go in the denominator, Bert has repurposed the extreme cases game.
Instead of evaluating potential solutions, he is placing constraints on what the unknown correct
solution must look like. Like Myra, he blends his physical intuition and symbolic forms to achieve
this.
The symbol template Bert uses is a division template,  , along with a conceptual schema about
inverse proportionality. It is a schema where as one quantity increases, another decreases, but in
the extreme case it shows that as one quantity grows very large, another becomes very small.
In applying this symbolic form, Bert begins with his intuitive understanding that very large,
heavy objects are difficult to move and blends in his formal understanding of inverse proportionality
to creatively generate a new instance of the extreme case game.
Bert did not wind up solving the problem; he rejected the correct solution on the mistaken
grounds that it was symmetric with respect to interchange of m and M , but despite not coming
to a complete solution, he generated unique insights as well as a partial solution by renegotiating
his relationships to the equation he was searching for while playing the extreme case game.
6 Implications for Instruction
It is common to see backsliding in surveys of student epistemologies over the course of introductory
physics. For most courses, students on average exit their college physics course with less-favorable
beliefs about how to learn physics than they had when they entered. [RSS98, APP+06] As epis-
temologies are tied to problem solving strategies (cite Ileana’s chapter), it’s likely that students’
conceptions of the role of mathematics and their approaches toward using it also deteriorate over
most year-long introductory sequences. This means that although we observed surprising and
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expert-like strategies in our problem-solving interviews, we need to be wary of the possibility that
our classes lead to students using these strategies less and less with time.
The reward and feedback structures in many introductory courses focus on evaluating whether a
student can perform a certain calculation correctly. This includes grades on homework and exams,
and in many circumstances, the verbal feedback students receive from instructors, for example
that in "initiate-response-evaluate" questioning [Meh79]. In most of the episodes we’ve cited in
this chapter, students wouldn’t have received positive feedback from such systems. Bert didn’t
get the correct answer when he found creative new applications of extreme case reasoning. Myra
blended her physical intuitions with formal mathematics in a symbolic form to get an expression
equivalent to the correct answer for how springs add, but her group didn’t take it up, and they
left the interview without have reached a consensus on the correct answer. Alma, when checking
the special case of a circular ellipse, used a dynamic ontology of the equation to reinforce her
understanding of the test she was performing, but wasn’t able to distinguish two answers which
both passed that test, and she wound up choosing the wrong answer. Each time, the students were
displaying expert-like problem-solving behaviors that we might not expect to see in introductory
courses, but because they didn’t come to the correct final conclusion, in many classrooms they
wouldn’t have received points on a test, heard their teachers praise, reiterate, extend on, or dive
more deeply into the reasoning, or seen their peers enthusiastically take up the same methods.
Because the type of feedback students receive can significantly affect their attitude toward learning
[CSL14, RCHH09], this lack of positive feedback when trying expert-like strategies could easily
quench students’ fledgling attempts at useful, general ways of solving problems and understanding
physics.
It isn’t surprising that the techniques that work for experts in problem solving are less effective
for novices. Learning to use tools takes practice. Riding a bicycle is much faster and more efficient
than walking once you know how to do it, but it can be wobbly, frightening, and even dangerous
at first. If we want students not only to try out strategies such as testing special cases or blending
intuition and formalism through symbolic forms, they need a freedom to fail, encouragement to
try out new ways of thinking, and positive reinforcement when they do so. Spike and Finkelstein
[SF16], studying recitation sections, found that the extent to which TAs do these things depends
on their beliefs about the goals of instruction. When instructors expand their goals beyond seeing
students perform calculations correctly (whether quantitative or qualitative) and value the growth
of new and useful ways of thinking, classrooms environments can take the seeds of expert-like
thought we’ve observed here and nurture them.
In our own courses, these observations have led us to two ways of encouraging new problem-
solving behaviors. The first is asking questions which focus on evaluating the meaning of formulas,
as opposed to using them as black boxes. For example, a problem from the textbook by Serway
and Jewett ([RAS04]) reads
Consider a gas at a temperature of 3500 K whose atoms can occupy only two energy
levels separated by 1.5 eV . . . Determine the ratio of the number of atoms in the higher
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energy level to the number in the lower energy level.
The solution involves using the formula for the Boltzmann factor as a black box tool. To encourage
different ways of reasoning about the formula, in a class one of us (Redish) taught recently, a quiz
question asked
When a membrane allows one kind of ion to pass through and not another, a con-
centration difference can lead to an electric potential difference developing across the
membrane. For example, if the concentration of NaCl on one side of a membrane is
c1 = 10mM and c2 = 2mM on the other, letting only Na+ ions through (and not
Cl-) will build up a potential difference across the membrane. This is controlled by the
equation that says that the electric potential energy, q∆V , balances the concentration
difference effects via the Boltzmann factor thus:
c1
c2
= e
−q∆V
kBT
For a given set of concentrations (c1 and c2 fixed) would you expect increasing the
temperature to increase , decrease, or leave the Nernst potential, ∆V , unaffected?
This question encourages students to reason about the functional form of the Boltzmann factor,
perhaps by imagining extreme cases or using symbolic forms. It also encourages students to think
of T not as a fixed entity, but as a parameter that can be tuned to change both the physical
behavior of a system and the numerical value in an equation.
In addition to asking questions that encourage students to reason about formulas instead of
apply them in order to get the right answer, we also ask questions that encourage students to
reflect on formulas without the need to extract a final correct or incorrect answer. For example,
in one of our recitation exercises, students are asked to construct their own equation to describe
when a worm will begin to suffocate as we scale up its size (reducing its surface area to volume
ratio) [RC13]. We then ask students,
Our analysis in [the previous part] was a modeling analysis. An organism like an
earthworm might grow in two ways: by just getting longer or isometrically – by scaling
up all its dimensions. What can you say about the growth of an earthworm by these
two methods as a result of your analysis in [the previous part]? Does a worm have a
maximum size? If so, in what sense? If so, find it.
These more open-ended and reflective questions ask students to use formulas - formulas they have
constructed, for interpretation and coming to new inferences, both about physical systems and
about the mathematical properties of equations.
Throughout this chapter, we have searched for a number of creative ways students approach
problems, including thinking about the extreme cases, conceptualizing parameters in different ways,
and using equations for estimation. In interviews, students do all these things, but they can easily
lead the student seemingly nowhere—no correct answer to a question, no encouragement from an
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instructor, no adoption by peers. To encourage students to try out useful but difficult-to-master
new strategies, we continue refining the way we ask questions and attend to student thinking during
instruction.
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